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Abstract. There is a growing belief that the agents' cognitive structures play a
central role on the enhancement of predicative capacities of decision-making
strategies. This paper analyses and simulates the construction of cognitive so-
cial structures in the process of decision making with multiple actors. In this
process it is argued that the agent's rational choices may be assessed by its mo-
tivations, according to different patterns of social interactions. We first con-
struct an abstract model of social dependence between agents, and define a set
of social structures that are easily identifiable according to potential interac-
tions. We then carry out a set of experiments at micro-social levels of analysis,
where the agents' cognitive structures are explicitly represented. These experi-
ments indicate that different social dependence structures imply distinct struc-
tural patterns of negotiation proposals, which appear to have diverse patterns of
complexity in the search space. It is subsequently shown that this observation
emerges as an issue of ambiguity in the regulation of different decision-making
criteria, relative to motivation-oriented and utility-oriented choices. In the
scope of this ambiguity, we finally make some conjectures relative to further
analytical and empirical analysis around the relation between patterns of com-
plexity of social structures and decision-making.
1   Introduction
The problems encountered in the implementation of autonomous agents that decide
and adopt goals on behalf of other agents, have determined a growing need to imple-
ment different degrees of social reasoning abilities in the individual agent's machinery
[26]. The need for an increasing autonomy in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) shares
some of the difficulties encountered in explanatory models of purposive action [18,20]
in the social sciences. These models rest on the assumption that actors in a dynamic
social world are purposive, and act in ways that produce intended and/or beneficial
results. By advancing the postulate that individual action is goal directed the prevalent
question runs around the way people, given their values, beliefs and high-level norma-
tive organization behaviors, make choices. The same question naturally arises when
designing artificial autonomous agents, and the discipline of Multi-Agent Based Simu-
lation (MABS) naturally emerges as an adequate platform for the study of social rea-
soning and decision-making strategies in natural or artificial societies. Agents in artifi-
cial social systems do not always have control over the other agents' decisions, includ-
ing the goals they should pursue and the actions they should execute. Such conditions
are either constrained by the inherent distribution of goals and knowledge in the sys-
tem (most problem solving systems using a MAS approach, e.g., [13]) or deliberately
defined by the system designer to investigate cognitive aspects of the individual agent
and/or emergent properties of the system as a whole (most systems in MABS [14]). In
either way, rational autonomous agents need social reasoning abilities to choose goals
and partners with adequate capabilities, and to generate proposals to convince the
others to collaborate favorably to their collective or individual goals.
The problem of rational choice among a set of feasible alternatives is frequently as-
sociated with the question of choice between different decision-making strategies.
Some authors advocate a context-bounded notion of rationality, such that different
contexts call for different decision-making strategies [7]. For instance, utility theory
based on the classic economic principle of rationality does not always conform to
human choice behavior [18] and significant evidence in the MABS field seems to
show that the ordering of alternatives to maximize the difference between benefits and
costs does not provide an increase on the number of coalitions in a multi-strategy
world [7]. Even if information is obtained easily and the perfect rationality assumption
is relaxed, the individual must often consider alternatives sequentially and decide
about them as they are presented. Limited information-processing capacity causes
agents to rely on a number of heuristic principles that reduce the complexity of even
simple problems, meaning the assumption of utility maximization is discarded for the
weaker assumption of procedural rationality [27]. Moreover, there is a growing belief
that agents' cognitive and motivational structures play a central role in the enhance-
ment of predicative capacity of decision-making strategies. For instance, this seems to
be the main motivation behind the design of the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI)
(e.g.[21]) and the Belief-Values-Goals (BVG) [2] architectures.
There are other attempts to introduce cognitive individual ingredients in the process
of decision making, in which, unlike BDI architectures, the social structures between
agents are explicitly represented, lending it easily to social simulation based-analysis.
In the Theory of Social Power and Dependence Networks [4,26] agents have different
capabilities that are complementary to achieve a set of goals. The individual agent
behavior is determined by its motivations, according to patterns of social interactions
that may occur with other agents, like, for example, social exchange or cooperation.
The type of social interactions is determined by the agent's situation in his structure of
dependence relations. The notion of rationality is thus based on relational notions of
dependence, allowing the definition of different taxonomies of dependence situations
between agents. In the present work we will call this type of rationality motivation-
oriented rationality, and will analyze and simulate the construction of social power
and dependence structures [4,26,6,24,8] in the scope of high-level collaboration with
generation of proposals for making coalitions with multiple actors. The objective is to
analyze the properties of associating motivation-oriented and utility-oriented decision-
making criteria in artificial institutions by using multi-agent modeling and multi-agent
based simulation.
There are several reasons to account for high-level collaboration models in multi-
agent based simulation (MABS) and more generally in multi-agent systems (MAS)1.
Firstly, agent social interactions frequently occur through high-level communica-
tion languages, and consequently are conducted on levels of abstraction within or
above Newell's Knowledge Level [19,16]. On a practical level, the system designer
usually prescribes the agent's goals. However, the unpredictable nature of the other
agents' motivations, and high-level normative organizational behaviors, raises higher
the dynamics of the other agents' goals to the eye of the agent. Agents may not only
need to exchange tasks or specific actions, but may need to measure, exchange and
adopt each other's goals in substantive terms. Secondly, the complexity of social rea-
soning in terms of goal adoption and goal delegation structures has been shown to be a
NP complete problem [10]. Such complexity calls for active experimentation on both
micro-social and macro-social levels, in order to assess patterns of interdependencies
that may enhance the search for adequate partners and the collaboration process
among cognitive agents.
In the scope of this article, we therefore adopt a two step methodological analysis,
the first one based on multi-agent modeling and the second on controlled experimenta-
tion.
In the first step, we analyze cognitive representations of social dependence struc-
tures in the context of relations from a single agent to a non-empty set of agents (1:n).
Different power and dependence structures are systematized, conceding different
effects in one agent's ability to find and influence others to collaborate. The agents'
decision mechanisms use both utility-oriented and motivation-oriented criteria to
choose adequate partners and proposals to form coalitions.
In the second step, we use agent-based simulation to test our rationality approach.
Here, we advocate that the complexity of social power and dependence patterns may
be assessed with the simulation of dependence structures in artificial societies. These
simulations may range from highly controlled experiments with emphasis on the indi-
vidual agent representations of social structures (with an explicit relation to the cogni-
tive agent's machinery) to highly stochastic experiments with a descriptive analysis of
the artificial system as a whole (where the relation to the cognitive agent's machinery
is more difficult to assess). One objective in our experiments is to emphasize the simu-
lation of cognitive representations of dependence structures at the micro-social level,
as being complementary to the simulation and assessment of patterns of dependence at
the macro-social level, the last one being usually analyzed in statistical terms.
Perhaps with the exception of Conte and Pedone [7], where the authors try to assess
some cognitive ingredients of individual rationality on micro-social and macro-social
levels of analysis, one may notice that the literature of MABS [14] has prevalently
1 An extensive review concerning possible vectors for cross-fertilization among Multi-Agent
Systems and Agent-Based Social Simulation may be found in the introductory chapter of the
last MABS workshop [14].
simulated social phenomena from a macro-social perspective of analysis. This report
shares some foundational aspects with [7], namely, that an experimental manipulation
of cognitive internal variables is necessary to increase the predicative capacity of
decision making and social scientific theories. However, we will restrict our experi-
ments to the micro-social perspective of analysis, and present some further conjectures
for future vectors of research that may require us to use a macro-social level of analy-
sis.
We start in section two by presenting a cognitive model of social reasoning that
generates different dependence structures and proposals of coalitions with multiple
agents. This model is based on a social reasoning mechanism [26,8] and in this paper
especially stresses its emphasis on the paradoxical usage of both utility-oriented and
motivated-oriented decision-making criteria for selection of partners and generation of
proposals. In section three we proceed with the simulation of these representations and
present our preliminary results.
The results suggest that distinct dependence situations [26] span different patterns
of proposal structures for coalition formation, which seem to have different patterns of
complexity in the search space. We further show that such patterns introduce ambigui-
ty in the orderliness of different criteria, related to individual utility-oriented and mo-
tivation-oriented decision making. While the agent deliberation dynamics in MAS and
MABS calls for combined measures of motivation-oriented and utility-oriented ration-
ality, we suggest that additional analytical work at micro-social levels of analysis and
empirical work at macro-social levels of analysis is required, in order to understand
and change dynamically the agent's rational abilities according to relations between
dependence patterns and the corresponding complexity in the search space.
2   Goal Hierarchies and Adoption
Agents might depend on others (or prefer the others) to achieve some of their goals,
which ultimately leads them to negotiate and exchange partially delegated goals. An
agent's endogenous goal (e.g. a goal assigned by the system designer) will often need
to explore social objects in the exterior world. Strictly speaking, by endogenous we
mean a goal that is stored at the Knowledge Level in Newell's sense. Accordingly,
new goals (and beliefs) may be acquired in the Knowledge Level owing precisely to
the social world. Goals may in fact be adopted instrumentally in order to obtain some
advantage in return [4]. If this is the case, the adopted goal may be seen as a "means-
to-ends" link to a higher order goal in a tree hierarchy of goals.
We may consider the multiplicity of potential pairs [adopted goal/partner] to be an
or-hierarchy sub-tree associated with an agent's endogenous higher-order goal. The
question for a rational agent is therefore: which external goals to adopt and to which
partners send the corresponding proposals for collaboration? This work does not con-
centrate on the decision problem related to choice of active endogenous goals, but on
the choice of external goals pertaining to such or-hierarchy sub-trees.
In previous work we have proposed a decision model built upon the social reason-
ing mechanism [26,8], which is based on the Theory of Dependence and Social Power
[4]. Shortly, if an agent depends on a third-party agent in order to achieve his goal, the
third-party's goals may become candidates for adoption, meaning the adoption is
strictly instrumental. The choice of a goal among a set of goal candidates for adoption
is based on both quantitative and qualitative measures of dependence relations be-
tween the agents.
2.1   Dependence Relations
We consider that the agent ago  Ag is a generic agent in a finite set of agents, desig-nated subject agent, who uses his social reasoning mechanism in order to better pro-
pose/accept coalition proposals to/from other agents. Agents model the other agents'
goals, plans and controlled actions through a data structure that we call external de-
scription. The external description comprises a finite set of entries, each one holding a
set of goals, plans and controlled actions for each known agent in the agency. With
such a structure a subject agent is able to calculate a set of dependence relations be-
tween any specific agent, which here we will call object agent, and his peers2.
An object agent ago is dependent on a third-party agent agt, in regard to a specificgoal g, according a specific set of plans P, iff the object agent needs to execute an
action controlled by the third-party agent and not controlled by the object agent -
d_on(ago,agt,g,P). One may have several types of dependence relations among twoagents: unilateral, bilateral, mutual and reciprocal dependencies. A Mutual Depend-
ence (MD) between the object and the third-party agents represents a bilateral de-
pendence concerning the same goal. A Reciprocal Dependence (RD) defines a bilat-
eral dependence in regard to two different goals. Another concept in the model is the
notion of dependence situation (dep-sit), which tries to capture an agent's susceptibil-
ity to adopt another agent's goal. Dependence situations relate two agents and a goal,
and may be locally or mutually believed, depending on their source, i.e. the set of
plans that is used to infer them. This is actually a somewhat intuitive notion. For ex-
ample, let us imagine we are pondering to create a new business company and we are
looking for interested partners: it is rather insightful to examine to what extent may we
use exclusively our plans to collaborate, meaning the dependence situation is locally
believed, or question ourselves if they share an identical opinion, meaning the de-
pendence is mutually believed3.
In this paper, we will use Pago(ago) when referring to the object's agent set of plans,and Pago(agt) when referring to the plans the object agent believes the third-party has.In the latest case we will often abbreviate Pago(agt) simply to the third-party agent set
2 For simplicity and clarity we assume here that the subject and object are the same, i.e., the
subject agent reasons about his own properties. We also assume that agents have complete
and correct beliefs about each other. These assumptions are not restricted in the social rea-
soning model, as it may be seen in [25]. Furthermore, we assume that agents are sincere,
meaning they do not communicate to others information in which they do not believe.
3 More precisely, meaning that we believe that the dependence is mutually believed. We use
this notion of mutual belief in the rest of the paper.
of plans. In addition, we will omit the explicit reference to the object agent in the
formulae and will often use P(agt) instead of Pago(agt).Two elementary relations of dependence called Inverse Dependence Relations
(IDR) are particularly useful in our work. Each IDR represents a certain amount of
power owned by an object agent over a specific third-party agent and goal. Such pow-
er may be inferred according to the object agent's set of plans or according to the
third-party agent set of plans. We call a third-party agent dependence on the object
agent, inferred according to some goal and the plans the object agent thinks the
third-party has, a Remote Believed Inverse Dependence:
RBID(ago,agt,g)def d_on(agt,ago,g,P(agt)).Conversely, a Local Believed Inverse Dependence defines a third-party agent de-
pendence on the object agent according to the object agent's set of plans:
LBID(ago,agt,g)def d_on(agt,ago,g,P(ago)).For instance, consider the following airline companies scenario, with an object
agent Af and his external description shown in figure 1.
Identity:  <Af af.somewhere.com 3856> Goals: Paris/Sydney(120)
Actions: Paris/Moscow(52); Paris/London(8); Paris/Lisbon(26)
Plans: Paris/Sydney:= Paris/Lisbon, Lisbon/Macau, Macau/HongK, HongK/Sydney.
Identity:  <Tp tp.north.com 7352> Goals: Lisbon/Moscow(300)
Actions: Lisbon/Paris(26); Lisbon/Macau(156); Macau/HongK(2)
Plans: Lisbon/Moscow:= Lisbon/Paris, Paris/Moscow.
Identity:  <Au au.anywhere.com 7366> Goals: Sydney/SaoPaulo (45)
Actions: Sydney/BuenosAires(147); HongK/Sydney(100)
Plans: Sydney/SaoPaulo:= Sydney/BuenosAires, BuenosAires/SaoPaulo.
Tp tp.north.com 7352>
|------ Lisbon/Moscow (300) (RBID)
|------ Lisbon/Moscow:= Lisbon/Paris, Paris/Moscow. (Feasible NLSource)
|------ Paris/Moscow (52)
Figure 1. An example of dependence relations.
Here, goals can be satisfied by flight carriers with desired departure and destination
points. Plans represent routes with multiple stops to fulfill multiple market shares.
According to Af's beliefs it is possible to infer that he depends unilaterally on
agents Tp and Au, when considering the goal Paris/Sydney and his own set of plans:
Tp controls actions Lisbon/Macau and Macau/HongK, and Au controls HongK/Sydney.
Conversely, agent Af may infer a remote believed IDR relative to agent Tp and goal
Lisbon/Moscow, since Tp depends on Af for action Paris/Moscow according to Tp's
plans. One may also notice that agent Au does not originate any IDR according to Af
beliefs. In fact, Af does not have anything to offer to Au, either according to Af's plans
or Au's plans. The dependence structure in the bottom of the figure identifies agent
Af's possible offered goals, plans and actions relative to agent Tp. Here, we say that
the goal Lisbon/Moscow is an offered-goal. The corresponding plan is designated
offered-plan and the action Paris/Moscow is called an offered-action.
In the context of high-level negotiation, any IDR may be seen as a potential pro-
posal to the third-party agent. The object agent has power over the third-party agent
desired goal, which is ultimately associated with a set of actions partially controlled by
the proponent and some set of plans. We use IDRs to define the set of all possible
offered goals to the third-party agent.
Formally, the set of offered goals comprises all goals making the third-party agent
agt dependent on the object agent ago, either according to the object agent's set ofplans or the third-party agent set of plans, i.e., local or remote believed IDRs:
O-G(agt)def {g  G(agt) | LBID(ago,agt,g)  RBID(ago,agt,g)}.
The corresponding set of possible offered plans comprises plans in the object
agent's set of plans P(ago) or in the third-party agent set of plans P(agt) for which thethird-party agent depends on the object agent4:
O-P(agt)def {p(P(ago) P(agt)) | (a adep(ago,agt),g O-G(agt))(uses(p,a)  goal(p)=g)}.
Finally, the associated set of possible offered actions comprises members of the ob-
ject agent's set of controlled actions A(ago) for which the third-party agent dependsaccording to the set of offered plans and offered goals. Note that an offered action
must necessarily be performed by the object agent, although it may be performed
according to a plan believed by the object agent and/or believed by the third-party
agent:
O-A(agt)def {a  A(ago)  |  (p  O-P(agt)) (uses(p,a)  a  A(agt))}
Offered goals are captured by the notion of conjunctive dependencies, namely mul-
ti-goal and-dependencies, where the third-party depends on the object agent for multi-
ple goals. Conversely, a set of offered plans relative to a same offered goal is captured
by the notion of multi-plan or-dependencies. In Conte and Castelfranchi [6] and David
et al. [8] it is shown in a substantive sense that conjunctive IDRs augment the power
over the third-party, while disjunctive IDRs increases the flexibility for negotiation by
augmenting the set of available alternatives.
2.2   Performance, Choice and Rationality
The problem of choice among a set of feasible proposals is inherently connected with
expected performance. Generally, if the principle of non-benevolence is assumed, we
may find two major trends for measuring the agents' individual performance [5,7,9].
The first one adopts a utility oriented scale, calculated according to the cost of the
agents' actions against the worth of the corresponding goals, whatever goals these may
be. Such theories specify that when as agent is acting rationally, the agent is engaging
in some kind of optimization. The agent's decision functions are fundamentally con-
cerned with the choice of actions that maximize utility, often according to the classic
principle of economic rationality (e.g.[29]). Choice of goals is not so critical to the
individual agent since the agent designer often prescribes (hardwires) the goals in the
agent's machinery. Paradoxically, utility-oriented agents may have to drop high value
4 adep(ago,agt) is the set of actions controlled by the object agent but not controlled by the
third-party.
goals in favor of lower value goals if the difference between benefits and costs in the
latter case is higher than the former. Also, agents are usually required to have a high
level of knowledge and computational ability with which to determine and evaluate a
set of available alternatives.
A motivation oriented perspective of individual rationality will most probably value
a substantive [7,9], hedonistic view, of rationality; that is, individual performance
measured in terms of the agents' attained goals (e.g. number of goals). Here, similar to
Newell's principle of rationality, the real motive for being rational is focused on the
agents' own goals. In this case, the agent's decision functions are essentially concerned
with the choice of adequate partners in order to achieve a set of individual goals.
Here, the choice of proper interactions among a set of alternatives is generally qualita-
tive in nature, according to orderings of qualitatively different patterns of dependence
between agents.
A number of problems have been identified with classical utility decision theory,
like orderability of preferences or computational complexity (e.g.[22]). Nevertheless,
these theories seem to be adequate to model a number of social phenomena, such as
the problem of emergence of cultural groups [15] or social trade networks [11]. Simi-
larly in MAS with real distributed and open environments (e.g. the Internet), the
agents abilities are specified to a great extent in terms of auctions and services (e.g.
white and yellow pages, search engines), making utility oriented decision theories
adequate to applications such as electronic commerce.
While different utility-oriented models share the fact that agents are purposive, in
the sense that they act in ways that tend to produce beneficial results, the heterogenei-
ty of agents and their different goals makes a motivation-oriented notion of perfor-
mance also desirable. Together with other authors [18,4,7], we advocate that goal
directed behavior often results not a from a conscious weighing of the expected future
benefits of alternative lines of action, but from a less deliberate response to beliefs
internalized through the socializing influences of social structure. For instance, in
artificial societies, a crucial operational issue in coalition formation is the problem
around the choice of offered goals, selected from a given set of candidate alternative
proposals. Another related problem is the issue of delegation and goal adoption, which
seems to play a crucial role in human-computer interaction [3]. In a dynamic and het-
erogeneous world there may be different decision-making strategies to accept coali-
tion proposals, with some agents possibly being more hedonistic and others utilitarian.
These issues ask for complementary types of rationality for the generation of pro-
posals, which in our view must use both utility-driven and motivation-driven strate-
gies. The agents' evaluation of receiving proposals against their goals means that an
explicit and social structural link may be established between selection of partners and
choice of proposals. In this work we simulate such an approach and utilize the notion
of dependence situations and dependence strength.
The former notion is a motivated-oriented definition of qualitatively different pat-
terns of dependence, calculated according to different configurations of dependence
relations between agents.
The later concept has an intended utility and motivation oriented hybrid character,
a function expressing the object agent's preferences, with equal probabilities, between
actions that may be offered to a same third-party agent. For each possible partner in a
coalition, the object agent's offered action strength is calculated according to its cost
and the substantive contribution to all possible offered goals and plans. This means
that for each possible partner there will be a finite set of possible atomic states, each
one corresponding to a different action controlled by the object agent. Naturally such
a function, which we call offered action strength, will often be a domain dependent
function. To our ends, we will use the following simplified formula:
a-strengthagt(a)=def ( i Np l a n s (g i ,a ) .w(ag t ,g i ) ) /c (ag o ,a ) ) , where gi is any offeredgoal for which the offered action a can contribute, w(agt,gi) is the goal importanceaccording to the third-party agent5, Np l a n s (g i ,a ) is the number of offered plans forgoal g i that use the offered action, and c(ago ,a ) is a positive integer representing thecost of the offered action according to the object agent. Notice that the numerator
expresses a hedonistic view of preferences, favoring actions that maximize the contri-
bution to the importance of offered goals.
The notion of dependence strength considers the number of possible offered actions
and ponders and integrates their strength:
dep-strength(agt)=def  a  O-A(agt) a-strengthagt(a)The latter definition identifies the most dependent agents on the proponent accord-
ing to the relevance of his set of available proposals. The former formula suggests the
most valued offered actions, playing an important role during the selection of negotia-
tion proposals.
2.3   Choice of Partners and Proposals
Suppose that some object agent ago is pursuing some goal ge and commits to someplan pe called respectively the engaged goal and engaged plan. Let us assume he isdependent on others to achieve that goal and execute that plan. Also, for every action
ad on which the agent depends on others in the plan pe, there is a non-empty set ofpossible partners represented in the external description that are able to perform it (i.e.
the plan is feasible [23]). Furthermore, possibly different patterns of dependence rela-
tions will hold for each possible partner.
If the object agent depends on a possible partner for the engaged goal and plan, he
may wish to calculate if the latter also depends on him for some of his goals and plans.
However, their set of plans may differ, and the object agent may infer, for instance, a
mutual dependence relating him and a possible partner, whereas the latter does not
infer the same bilateral dependence according to his plans. In order to capture this
5 We assume that the importance of the third-party agent goal is known to the object agent - the
computation of the exact importance is in fact not possible in most situations. We however
assume that the object agent stores this information in his external description when consid-
ering his qualitative knowledge about these goals (e.g. to a certain extent different companies
may know each others' order of preferences of strategic goals). Since we do not deal with
learning and perception issues in this paper, we do not loose generality in the model and ex-
periences, since their focus is essentially on the properties of social dependence networks
and its cognitive representations.
possible awareness of the partners, a notion called dependence situation was defined
[26]. In the rest of this paper we adopt the taxonomy and partial ordered set of de-
pendence situations used in [24]: MBMD > (MBRD,LBMD) > LBRD > UD (meaning
for instance that MBMD is higher than UD).
The last two letters in the acronyms differentiate Mutual Dependencies (MD) from
Reciprocal Dependencies (RD). As for the first two letters, if the dep-sit is Mutually
Believed (MB) it indicates that is inferred according to both the object and the third-
party set of plans. If the dep-sit is Locally Believed (LB) indicates that the dep-sit is
inferred according to the object agent's set of plans. UD stands for Unilateral Depend-
ence, meaning the object agent depends on the third-party but the latter does not de-
pend on the former according to the object agent's set of plans, i.e., there are no
LBIDs. There is a minor difference here from [24] in that we do not use the situation
named IND (Independence), since we assume the object agent depends on others for
the engaged goal.
Consider the function dep-sitago(agt,ge) that calculates the dependence situation ac-cording to the object agent, a third-party agent agt  Ag and the object agent' engagedgoal ge  G(ago). We next describe a collection of partial ordered sets and decisionfunctions with respect to the choice of possible partners and the corresponding pro-
posals.
Choice of Partners - if two agents pertain to a same set of possible partners for the
object agent, then ag' parrtner ag iff: (1) ag'=ag; or (2) if ag' dep-sit regarding ago and geis lower then ag; or (3) agents have equal deps-sits and ag' dependence strength is
lower than ag; or (4) agents have equal dep-sits, equal dependence strengths and the
cost of the action ad according to ag' is higher than ag.
In conclusion, for each action the preferred partner is chosen from the correspond-
ing set of possible partners according to a sequence of priorities, primarily motiva-
tion-driven (first and second criteria), but also utility-driven (second and third crite-
ria).
Choice of Offered Goals - Except for unilateral dependencies, the set of chosen of-
fered goals for each preferred partner, results primarily from the set of offered goals
originating the highest dep-sit.
C-OG(agt,ge)
{ge} if dep-sitago (agt,ge)=MBMD or LBMD
{g' O-G(agt) | LBID(ago,agt,g')  RBID(ago,agt,g')} if dep-sitago (agt,ge)=MBRD
{g' O-G(agt) | LBID(ago,agt,g')} if dep-sitago (agt,ge)=LBRD
{g' O-G(agt) | RBID(ago,agt,g') if dep-sitago (agt,ge)=UDNotice in the case of unilateral dependencies (UD), that all chosen offered goals re-
sult necessarily from the set of plans the object agent thinks the preferred partner has,
i.e., Remote Believed IDRs. In the case of mutual dependencies the engaged goal and
the chosen offered goal are necessarily the same.
Choice of Offered Plans - Similar to the computation of offered goals, the set of cho-
sen offered plans is highly dependent on the inferred dep-sit. The best feasible offered
plans are the ones believed by both agents. Local believed plans are also preferred to
non-local believed plans.
Consider a set of offered plans calculated according to the chosen offered goals.
The chosen offered plans – C-OP(agt,ge) – are calculated according to the followingpartial order: p1 plan p2: iff  (1) p1=p2 or p1 is not feasible and p2 is feasible; or (2)
both are feasible and p1 is not mutually believed and p2 is mutually believed; or (3)
both plans are feasible and p1 is not locally believed and p2 is locally believed.
Choice of Offered Actions - Consider a set of offered actions calculated according to
the chosen offered plans. The set of chosen offered actions – C-OA(agt,ge) – are theones calculated according to the chosen offered plans and sharing the highest depend-
ence strength.
In summary, the preferred offered action is chosen from the object agent's set of
controlled actions associated with (1) offered goals originating the highest dep-sit;
(2) feasible and convenient source set of plans; (3) the maximum observed action
strength. Formally, the final proposal for each preferred partner agt, relative to theobject agent's engaged goal ge is therefore:
decideprop(agt,ge)=def (a, P(a), G(a)), with,
a=random(C-OA(agt,ge)),
P(a)={p  C-OP(agt,ge) | uses(p,a)}
G(a)={g  C-OG(agt,ge) |  (p  P(a)) (goal(p)=g)}.Strong offered actions are likely to cause positive social interference with several
offered plans and goals, increasing the quality of a proposal and the preferred partner's
susceptibility to accept the coalition.
3   Experimentation
Social simulation was the way to evaluate our ideas and find predominant patterns of
dependence that may be better accommodated in the model. We have implemented
short experiments for e-contracts with software packages for reuse [8] and more ex-
tensive experiments for strategic reasoning with airline transportation carriers. The
latter example, which we will present here, is a typical domain where companies may
establish coalitions in order to increase the number of carriers and destinations, for
instance, when building packages of lower price flights between multiple cities that
one individual company can not provide.
The experiments proceed in small steps and are highly controlled, with an almost
absence of random variables. The classical social simulation approach, inspecting
over emergent phenomena on a macro-social level (usually described in statistical
terms) is not our aim here. This would in fact be a difficult task as all objects (goals,
plans and actions) have a clear semantics, and are not randomly generated. Further-
more, and to a certain extent, the model itself shapes the relations that agents are al-
lowed to establish. Following [24], we therefore adopt a lower level analysis and try to
proceed slowly for an incremental understanding of social structures created by delib-
erative agents.
3.1   A First Simple Example
Companies must have a number of common goals and cross dependent carriers so as
to make an effective strategic agreement. Goals are available or desired carriers. Each
company ascribes a certain importance to their goals. Plans represent routes with mul-
tiple stops to fulfill multiple market shares. There may be several plans for a same
carrier and each company has its own set of preferred plans. Initially, suppose that
there are two agents known to agent Af: the agents Tp and Au. In figure 2 we show the
external description of agent Af.
I'm agent Af, running at af.somewhere.com, with pid 3856.
Identity: <Af af.somewhere.com 3856>
Goals: Paris/Sydney(120); Paris/Dublin(116); Rome/Boston(40); Rome/Marseille(33)
Actions: Paris/Moscow(52); Paris/London(8); Paris/Lisbon(26); Paris/Argel(22); Paris/Marseille(6);
Argel/Dackar(22); Paris/NewY(102); Paris/Toulouse(5); Toulouse/Marseille(6)
Plans: Paris/Dublin:= Paris/London, London/Dublin.
Paris/Sydney:= Paris/London, London/HongK, HongK/Sydney.
Paris/Sydney:= Paris/Lisbon, Lisbon/Macau, Macau/HongK, HongK/Sydney.
Rome/Boston:= Rome/Paris, Paris/NewY, NewY/Boston.
Rome/Marseille:= Rome/Paris, Paris/Toulouse, Toulouse/Marseille.
I have received the following messages of introduction:
Identity: <Tp tp.north.com 7352> Goals: Lisbon/Moscow(300)
Actions: Lisbon/Paris(26); Lisbon/Macau(156); Macau/HongK(2)
Plans: Lisbon/Moscow:= Lisbon/Paris, Paris/Moscow.
Identity: <Au au.anywhere.com 7366> Goals: Sydney/SaoPaulo (45)
Actions: Sydney/BuenosAires(147); Sydney/Pretoria(156); HongK/Sydney(100)
Plans: Sydney/SaoPaulo:= Sydney/BuenosAires, BuenosAires/SaoPaulo.
Figure 2. External description of agent Af.
In figure 3, agent Af builds his dependence network. We will present hereafter two
different kinds of networks. The first type, called dependence network, is constructed
when the agent reasons about his goals and expresses in a same structure all the object
agent's needed actions, considering all of his goals and plans. The second one, called
proposal network, is constructed when reasoning about partners and presents all pos-
sible partners and possible proposals for each needed action in some engaged plan.
In the dependence network, it can be observed that the agent has two goals (Par-
is/Sydney and Rome/Marseille). However, agent Af has only one achievable goal –
Paris/Sydney. He has two plans for that goal, but only one of them is feasible. Even
though the plan passing by Macau and Hong Kong  might not be the most advanta-
geous plan, there are no other feasible plans for his goal and he will try to form a coa-
lition. He is dependent on agent Tp for two needed actions – Lisbon/Macau and Ma-
cau/HongK – and on agent Au for needed action HongK/Sydney.
The information that agent Af captures from the proposal network is related to the
goals, plans and actions that he can offer to his possible partners. For each needed
action and possible partner in the engaged plan we may find information concerning
the highest dep-sit (d-sit), the dependence strength on the object agent (d-strength),
and the cost ascribed by the possible partner to the needed action (d-a-cost).
========== Reasoning about goals ...
My dependence network is:
<Af>
-- Paris/Sydney (120) (achievable)
|---- Paris/Sydney:= Paris/London, London/HongK, HongK/Sydney. (NFeasible)
|    |---------- London/HongK (NA)
|    |            |********** UNKNOWN
|    |            | HongK/Sydney (EC:100.0)
|    |            |********** <Au 7366> (100.0)
( . . . )
|    | Paris/Sydney:= Paris/Lisbon, Lisbon/Macau, Macau/HongK, HongK/Sydney. (EC:284)
|    |---------- Lisbon/Macau (EC:156.0)
|                 |**********  <Tp 7352> (156.0)
|                 | Macau/HongK (EC:2.0)
|                 |**********  <Tp 7352> (2.0)
|                 | HongK/Sydney (EC:100.0)
|                 |********** <Au 7366> (100.0)
( . . . )
| Rome/Marseille (33) (not achievable)
|---- Rome/Marseille:= Rome/Paris, Paris/Toulouse, Toulouse/Marseille. (NFeasible)
|---------- Rome/Paris (NA)
|---------- UNKNOWN
|----------
The engaged goal is: Paris/Sydney (120)
The engaged plan is:
Paris/Sydney:= Paris/Lisbon, Lisbon/Macau, Macau/HongK, HongK/Sydney. (EC:284)
========== Reasoning about partners ...
My needed actions are: <Lisbon/Macau>, <Macau/HongK>, <HongK/Sydney>
My possible partners, offered goals, plans and actions for each needed action are:
Lisbon/Macau and Macau/HongK
|-- <Tp tp.north.com 7352> / d-sit: UD / d-strength: 5.4 / d-a-cost: 156.0 and 2.0
|------- Lisbon/Moscow (300) (RBID)
|------- Lisbon/Moscow:= Lisbon/Paris, Paris/Moscow. (Feasible NLSource)
|------ Paris/Moscow (52)
|------
HongK/Sydney
|-- <Au au.anywhere.com 7366> / d-sit: UD / d-strength: 0.0 / d-a-cost: 100.0
|-------- no offered goals
Figure 3. Dependence and proposal network of agent Af.
In this scenario, all inferred dep-sits are Unilateral Dependencies (d-sit=UD).
However, agent Af has in fact something to propose to agent Tp. The power of Af over
Tp is not insignificant, according to the plans Af thinks Tp has: agent Af may be able to
use in an instrumental way the Remote Believed IDR with his proposal involving the
offered goal Lisbon/Moscow and the offered action Paris/Moscow. On the contrary,
agent Au dependence strength on Af is zero. Agent Af will not propose anything to
agent Au as shown in figure 4.
In figure 4, agent Af receives Tp's acceptance of proposal. On the other hand, agent
Au will reject Af’s proposal, which is justified by the non-benevolence principle. In
reality nothing was proposed to Au. The plan is no longer feasible since there are no
more possible partners available and all the agent’s goals become non-achievable.
The coalition was not formed. This example demonstrates on a practical level is
that it seems intuitive to specialize Sichman's dependence situations on both qualita-
tive and quantitative levels. A same dependence situation may be associated with
different influencing power conditions. Zero dependence strength implied scarcity of
substantive arguments to offer to agent Au. Yet, unilateral dependencies inferred ac-
cording to the proponent's plans, with non-zero dependence strength, may be recipro-
cated - it is also a priority to search for relations of power on the others agents' beliefs.
This was the case of agent Tp. Accordingly, it seems clear that social exchange [4]
may be triggered by unilateral dependencies coupled with remote believed IDRs (e.g.
Af with Tp), at least if not adopting pure cognitive-psychological examples like in
[24].
========== Deciding about partners ... (Partner choices criteria: d-sit > d-strength > action_cost )
The selected partner(s) and proposal(s) are :
| Needed actions: Lisbon/Macau, Macau/HongK
| Partner: <Tp tp.north.com>
| Offered goal/action:<Lisbon/Moscow>/<Paris/Moscow>
| Needed action: HongK/Sydney
| Partner: <Au au.anywhere.com>
| Offered goal/action: NONE/NONE
========== Sending and receiving messages ...
Sending proposals of coalition to <Tp tp.north.com 7352> ... <Au au.anywhere.com 7366>
The messages received are: (Acceptance <Tp 7352>), Refusal <Au 7366>)
My new list of possible partners, offered goals, plans and actions is:
HongK/Sydney
|------ no possible partners (empty list)
Informing agent <Tp tp.north.com 7352> that the proposal of coalition was canceled ...
========== Reasoning about goals ...
The engaged goal is no longer achievable.
Figure 4. Selection of partners and proposals.
3.2   Second Example
Let us suppose that after the previous events, four agents arrive at the agency: Ba, Tw,
Ai1 and Ai2. Additionally, to save space, suppose that agents Tp and Au had left the
agency. In figure 5 we show Ai1, Ai2, Ba and Tw external description entries.
In this scenario, the autonomy of agent Af increases significantly, with all his goals
becoming achievable - figure 6. Still, his most important goal will be the same - Par-
is/Sydney - even though he will choose another plan due to feasibility conditions.
There are two needed actions in this plan, London/HongK and HonK/Sydney. In the
dependence network represented in the figure, all four agents are able to execute Af’s
needed action HongK/Sydney.
I'm agent Af, at af.somewhere.com, with pid 3856, I have received the following messages of introduction:
Identity: <Ai1 ai1.anywhere.com 3855>
Goals: Rome/Boston(55); Rome/Marseille(34); Rome/London(20)
Actions: HongK/Sydney(113); Rome/Lisbon(23); Rome/Paris(12)
Plans: Rome/Boston:= Rome/Lisbon, Lisbon/NewY, NewY/Boston.
Rome/Boston:= Rome/Paris, Paris/NewY, NewY/Boston.
Rome/Boston:= Rome/Paris, Paris/London, London/NewY, NewY/Boston.
Rome/Marseille:= Rome/Paris, Paris/Marseille.   Rome/London:= Rome/Paris, Paris/London.
Identity: <Ai2 ai2.somewhere.com 3860> Goals: Rome/Boston(55)
Actions: HongK/Sydney(113); Rome/Lisbon(23); Rome/Paris(12)
Plans: Rome/Boston:= Rome/Lisbon, Lisbon/NewY, NewY/Boston.
Rome/Boston:= Rome/Paris, Paris/NewY, NewY/Boston.
Identity: <Ba ba.somewhere.org 3861> Goals: London/Maputo(100); London/Argel(90)
Actions: London/Paris(8); London/HongK(158); HongK/Sydney(113); London/Dublin(4)
Plans: London/Argel:= London/Paris, Paris/Argel.
Identity: <Tw tw.air.org 3865>
Goals: NewY/Argel(67); NewY/Camberra(60); NewY/Marseille(64); NewY/Dackar (66)
Actions: HongK/Sydney(103); NewY/London(115); NewY/Paris(120); NewY/Boston(10)
Plans: NewY/Argel:= NewY/London, London/Paris, Paris/Argel.
NewY/Dackar:= NewY/Paris, Paris/Argel, Argel/Dackar.
NewY/Argel:= NewY/Paris, Paris/Argel. NewY/Marseille:= NewY/Paris, Paris/Marseille.
Figure 5. Ai1, Ai2, Ba and Tw entries in the external description of agent Af.
With respect to the action HongK/Sydney shown in figure 7, both agents Ai1 and
Ai2 share a higher dep-sit - Mutual Believed Reciprocal Dependence (MBRD) - than
the one originated by Tw and Ba - Unilateral Dependence (UD). However, Ai1's de-
pendence strength on Af (=17.2) is higher compared to Ai2 (=0.5), giving to Af a sig-
nificant potential flexibility to negotiate with Ai1. For example, Af is aware that the
action Paris/London may be useful for two of Ai1's current goals (Rome/Boston and
Rome/London). Also, notice that agents Ai1, Ai2 and Ba share the same and the high-
est cost (d-a-cost=113.0) for the referred needed action HongK/Sydney. Yet, in figure
8, the strategic choice to execute the needed action will not fall on agent Tw, which
assigns the lowest cost to the needed action but originates the lowest dep-sit (UD).
As shown in figure 8, agent Ai1 was thus selected to execute the needed action
HongK/Sydney. The possible chosen offered goals are the ones originating the highest
dep-sit - Rome/Boston and Rome/Marseille (MBRD). The final choice of proposals to
Ai1 – Rome/Boston as the offered goal and Paris/NewY as the offered action – holds
some subtle points: (1) the action Paris/London, although less expensive, belongs to a
non-feasible local believed plan (NFeasible, LSource) – there would be no apparent
reason for Af to send this proposition; (2) even though actions Paris/Toulose and Tou-
louse/Marseille appertain to feasible plans, they are solely associated with Af's local
believed plans (LSource) – there would be no apparent reason for Ai1 to accept such
propositions; and (3) action Paris/Marseille is associated with a non-local believed
plan (NLSource) – although it may be possible that the partner would be willing to
accept it, there is one other plan believed by both sources that seems to be a better
choice for Af.
========== Reasoning about goals ...
My dependence network is:
<Af>
-- Paris/Sydney (120) (achievable)
|------ Paris/Sydney:= Paris/London, London/HongK, HongK/Sydney. (EC:276.5)
|      |---------- London/HongK (EC:158.0)
|      |            |**********  <Ba 3861> (158.0)
|      |            | HongK/Sydney (EC:110.5)
|      | |**********  <Ai1 3855> (113.0), <Ai2 3860> (113.0), <Ba 3861> (113.0), <Tw 3865> (103.0)
( . . . )
| Paris/Dublin (116) (achievable)
|------ Paris/Dublin:= Paris/London, London/Dublin. (EC:12.0)
|      |---------- London/Dublin (EC:4.0)
|                  |---------- <Ba 3861> (4.0)
|                              |----------
| Rome/Boston (40) (achievable)
|------ Rome/Boston:= Rome/Paris, Paris/NewY, NewY/Boston. (EC:124.0)
|      |---------- Rome/Paris (EC:12.0)
| |**********   <Ai1 3855> (12.0), <Ai2 3860> (12.0)
|                  | NewY/Boston (EC:10.0)
|                  |**********   <Tw 3865> (10.0)
( . . . )
The engaged goal is: Paris/Sydney (120)
The engaged plan is: Paris/London, London/HongK, HongK/Sydney. (feasible) (276.5)
Figure 6. Dependence network of agent Af.
========== Reasoning about partners ...
My needed actions are: <London/HongK>, <HongK/Sydney>
My possible partners, offered goals, plans and actions for each action are:
London/HongK
|-- <Ba ba.somewhere.com 3861> / d-sit: UD / d-strength: 4.1 / d-a-cost: 158.0
|-- London/Argel (90) (RBID)
|--- London/Argel:= London/Paris, Paris/Argel. (Feasible NLSource)
|--------- Paris/Argel (22)
HongK/Sydney
|- <Ai1 ai1.anywhere.com 3855> / d-sit: MBRD / d-strength: 17.2 / d-a-cost: 113.0
|--- Rome/Boston (55) (MBRD)
|   |-- Rome/Boston:= Rome/Paris, Paris/NewY, NewY/Boston. (Feasible BSources)
|   |   |--------- Paris/NewY (102)
|   |   |           |------
|   | | Rome/Boston:= Rome/Paris, Paris/London, London/NewY, NewY/Boston. (NFeasible
|   |   |--------- Paris/London (8) NLSource)
|   |               |------
|   | Rome/Marseille (34) (MBRD)
|   |-- Rome/Marseille:= Rome/Paris,Paris/Toulouse,Toulouse/Marseille.(Feasible LSource)
|   |   |--------- Paris/Toulouse (5), Toulouse/Marseille (6)
|   |   |           |-------
|   |   | Rome/Marseille:= Rome/Paris, Paris/Marseille. (Feasible NLSource)
|   | |--------- Paris/Marseille (6)
|   |               |-------
|   | Rome/London (20) (RBID)
|   |-- Rome/London:= Rome/Paris, Paris/London. (Feasible NLSource)
|       |--------- Paris/London (8)
|                   |------
| <Ai2 ai2.somewhere.com 3860> / d-sit: MBRD / d-strength: 0.5 / d-a-cost: 113.0
|---- Rome/Boston (55) (MBRD)
|    |-- Rome/Boston:= Rome/Paris, Paris/NewY, NewY/Boston. (Feasible BSources)
|        |--------- Paris/NewY (102)
|                   |------
| <Ba ba.somewhere.com 3861> / d-sit: UD / d-strength: 4.1 / d-a-cost: 113.0
|---- London/Argel (90) (RBID )
|    |-- London/Argel:= London/Paris, Paris/Argel. (Feasible NLSource)
|        |--------- Paris/Argel (22)
|                   |-----
| <Tw .air.org 3865> / d-sit: UD / d-strength: 95.4 / d-a-cost: 103.0
|---- NewY/Argel (67) (RBID)
|-- NewY/Argel:= NewY/London, London/Paris, Paris/Argel. (Feasible NLSource)
|  | NewY/Argel:= NewY/Paris, Paris/Argel. (Feasible NLSource)
|  |--------- Paris/Argel (22)
|             |-----
| NewY/Marseille (64) (RBID)
|-- NewY/Marseille:= NewY/Paris, Paris/Marseille. (Feasible NLSource)
|  |--------- Paris/Marseille (6)
|             |-------
| NewY/Dackar (66) (RBID)
|-- NewY/Dackar:= NewY/Paris, Paris/Argel, Argel/Dackar. (Feasible NLSource)
|--------- Paris/Argel (22), Argel/Dackar (22)
Figure 7. Proposal network of agent Af.
========== Deciding about partners ... (Partner choices criteria: d-sit > d-strength > action_cost)
The selected partner(s) and proposal(s) are:
¦ Needed action: HongK/Sydney, Partner: <Ai1 ai1.anywhere.com>
¦ Offered goal/action: <Rome/Boston>/<Paris/NewY>
¦ Needed action: London/HongK, Partner: <Ba af.somewhere.com>
¦ Offered goal/action: <London/Argel>/<Paris/Argel>
Figure 8. Selection of partners and generation of proposals.
In effect, the action Paris/NewY is associated with a plan believed by both sources
(BSources) and there is a mutual interest to form a coalition associated with that plan
and goal. This is actually true and in figure 9 the proposal networks of agent Ai1
shows that there is in fact a Mutual Believed Mutual Dependence (MBMD) relative to
the proponent Af and to the goal Rome/Boston that is the most valuable for Ai1.
Agent Ai1 accepts the proposal since he needs in fact the proposed offered goal and
offered action, as shown in figure 9. This mutual dependence arises since Af has the
goal Rome/Boston as well. Nevertheless, it differs from Af's dep-sit relative to Ai1
since they do not share the same set of plans.
========== Reasoning about messages ...
I have received a proposal of coalition: (PROPOSAL <Af af.somewhere.com 3856>
========== Reasoning about plans ...
My dependence network with reference to the proposed goal <Rome/Boston> is:
<Ai1>
-- Rome/Boston (55) (achievable)
|---Rome/Boston:= Rome/Lisbon, Lisbon/NewY, NewY/Boston. (NFeasible)
|---------- Lisbon/NewY (NA)
( . . . )              (. . . )
| Rome/Boston:= Rome/Paris, Paris/NewY, NewY/Boston. (EC:124.0)
|---------- Paris/NewY (EC:102.0)
|           |********** <Af 3856> (102.0)
|           |            |----------
|           | NewY/Boston (EC:10.0)
|           |**********  <Tw 3865> (10.0)
|                        |----------
| Rome/Boston:= Rome/Paris, Paris/London, London/NewY, NewY/Boston. (NFeasible)
|---------- Paris/London (EC:8.0)
|********** <Af 3856> (8.0)
|            |----------
| London/NewY (NA)
( . . . )
The engaged plan is: Rome/Paris, Paris/NewY, NewY/Boston. (feasible) (124.0)
My possible partners, offered goals, plans and actions are (action Paris/NewY):
Paris/NewY
|--
| <Af af.somewhere.com 3856> / d-sit: MBMD / d-strength: 88.0 / d-a-cost: 102.0
|---- Rome/Boston (40) (MBMD)
|----- Rome/Boston:= Rome/Lisbon, Lisbon/NewY, NewY/Boston. (NFeasible LSource)
|     |-------- Rome/Lisbon (23)
|     | |-----
|     | Rome/Boston:= Rome/Paris, Paris/NewY, NewY/Boston. (Feasible BSources)
|     |-------- Rome/Paris (12)
( . . . )
I will accept the proposal, because I do not have a better partner.
Figure 9. Dependence and proposal network of agent Ai1.
Agent Ba accepts Af's proposal as well and the coalition is formed (not shown
here). Similar to the first experiment, the proponent Af uses his bargaining power over
Ba according to the plans he thinks Ba has (using Ba's goal London/Argel and needed
action Paris/Argel).
3.3 Some Preliminary Comments - Substance, Utility and Complexity
The model seems to present a coherent behavior, however there are some comments to
be pointed out. For instance, a critical issue concerns the use of the decision-making
criteria for choice of partners, in which the motivation oriented criteria (dependence
situations) deliberately preceded the combined utility/motivation-oriented criteria
(dependence strength). A closer look to the second example would show that a change
of priorities in the partner selection criteria would elect agent Tw instead of Ai for the
needed action HongK/Sydney. Agent Tw originates a lower dependence situation (UD)
than agent Ai1 (MBRD). That is, the experiments give no clue whether high depend-
ence situations with small dependence strengths should be preferred to low depend-
ence situations with high dependence strengths.
A solution to this problem may be possible if a relation between dependence situa-
tions and some kind of expected dependence strength can be predicted. For example,
let us admit the possibility of a higher trust between partners pursuing a same goal,
against the case of pursuing different goals [4,24]. Accordingly, we have considered
Mutual Dependencies (one single offered goal) more valuable than Reciprocal De-
pendencies (one or more offered goals). Nevertheless it is possible to observe, after
running multiple experiments, that MDs seem to contribute less than RDs to the over-
all network dimension and thus overall dependence strength.
A similar point can be noticed with respect to the locality of plans: Mutual Be-
lieved Reciprocal Dependencies usually exhibit lower network dimensions than Local
Believed Reciprocal Dependencies, since the number of plans in the network seems to
be reduced with the mutual believed case, due to the intersection set of remote and
local believed IDRs (see section 2.3).
These issues raise some questions in terms of patterns of complexity in the search
space. For instance, mutual dependencies often offer a constrained expected space of
search for alternatives due to lower network dimensions. It is well known that agents
have bounded rationality [27]. We thus may ask: when should trust on a reduced set of
alternatives (e.g. mutual dependencies) be preferred to complex, but flexible, networks
of possible proposals and bargaining power, eventually with better expected utility
benefits (e.g. reciprocal dependencies)? Also, unlike our model of hybrid rationality
that confronts both decision approaches in the same level of abstraction, should utility
oriented analysis be analyzed on a distinct level of abstraction from the motivation
perspective, like for example in [1]? Interestingly, the software engineering oriented
work of Jennings and Campos [17] raises higher a set of utility oriented principles to
the Social Level of abstraction, above Newell's Knowledge Level.
Complexity can certainly get worse as may be observed at the end of the second
experiment. Here, the partner's Mutual Believed Mutual Dependency (Ai1) relative to
the proponent (Af) plays an important role for the coalition settlement, suggesting that
it could be interesting for the proponent to analyze the dependence situations relating
himself to the other agents. The case would get farther worse if transitive relations
were analyzed, leading to analysis of group cohesion.
Regarding these latter points, our experiences are not yet satisfactory. Our conjec-
ture is that further effort is needed to account for a clear relation between complexity
and frequently observed dependence patterns. Such effort must be made, on one hand,
with further analytical considerations on the complexity of dependence structures
(micro-social level) and, on another hand, with empirical analysis of patterns of de-
pendence structures (macro-social level). If such a relation is established, then a dy-
namic readjustment between utility-oriented and motivation-oriented rationality may
be better achieved, by adapting dynamically the agents' rational abilities according to
the complexity associated with each dependence situation and available resources. We
would also add that this observation clearly establishes methodological evidences
around the complementary character of (i) analytical and empirical considerations on
the complexity of cognitive social structures at micro-social levels and (ii) empirical
analysis of patterns of social dependence structures at macro-social levels.
4   Conclusions
While the technology and normative references for agent interoperability in MAS (e.g.
[12]) and MABS (e.g. SWARM [28]) is rapidly being deployed in a wide range of
platforms, the predicative tools to deal with complex patterns of social dependencies
that emerge within and between agent artificial societies are still inadequate. This
work followed a two step methodological approach involving modeling and social
simulation based-analysis. Our model for coalition formation was built on the assump-
tion that dependence based choices of partners and proposals are obligatorily integrat-
ed issues. The experiments were accomplished at the micro-social level and were able
to identify different degrees of influencing power for a same dependence situation,
suggesting that social exchange may also be triggered by Unilateral Dependencies.
Further experimental results indicated that different dependence situations span dif-
ferent patterns of proposal structures, which appear to have different degrees of com-
plexity in the search space. This observation emerged as an issue of ambiguity in the
previous underlined decision model, concerning the orderliness of different criteria
with respect to motivation-oriented and utility-oriented choices. While MAS dynamics
calls for combined measures of motivation and utility oriented rationality, we claim
that additional analytical analysis at micro-social levels and empirical analysis at mac-
ro-social levels is required. Such analysis may open the way to disambiguate and dy-
namically affect the agents' rational abilities according to relations between patterns of
dependence and expected complexity in the search space.
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